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ABSTRACT 
 
In Bangladesh, experiences from good practices for a Common Property 
Resources (CPR) identified that it is necessary to choose CPR members from 
the resource users with clearly defined rights to use the resource with defined 
physical boundary. The long-term security of tenure is a precondition for 
establishment of common property resources in the water bodies by the users 
(mainly fishers and adjoining agriculturists of the water body) themselves. The 
sustainability of such CPRs depends on the equity in sharing expenses and 
income; monitoring by the users themselves; graduated sanctions for violations 





Bangladesh has a large number of government-owned water bodies (jalmohals) 
which have been the focus of a series of development projects over the last two 
decades. This paper is based on experiences from the IFAD funded Oxbow 
Lakes Project (OLP-2), Aquaculture Development Project (AqDP), and 
Sunamganj Community Based Resource Management Project (SCBRMP), but it 
also draws on lessons from other similar projects, like the Patuakhali-Barguna 
Aquaculture Development Project (PBAEP), the Fourth Fisheries Project (FFP) 
and the Community Based Fishery Management Project (CBFM-1 and 2). 
Together these projects have covered more than 200 water bodies and span a 
period of almost two decades.  
 
All khas properties come under the Ministry of Land. But MoL does not directly 
deal with or manage these properties. There are three ways in which their 
management is dealt with: 
•   Devolution refers to the transfer of management responsibility and 
authority over the use of natural resources from the government to other 
agencies, specifically to non-government agencies.  
•   Decentralization refers to the transfer of management and authority to 
lower levels of government.  
•   Co-management is the system of sharing of responsibility and authority 
between government and non-government bodies, usually some form of 
organization of resource users. 
 
There are a number of possible routes out of an open access system. One is to 
privatize the resource, make it the property of the lease-holder. Another is to turn 
it into a resource for government organizations to invest in. A third is to turn into a 
common property resource (CPR) of the fishers. Yet another is to turn it into the 
common property not of fishers, but of the community. All four methods have 
been tried in Bangladesh.  
   3
Longer-term leases and secure user rights, both necessary for the shift from 
capture fisheries to aquaculture or other forms of managed fisheries have 
become possible through a number of projects in Bangladesh. Of the various 





Before the GoB-IFAD-DANIDA-BRAC, OLP-2 (ox-bow lakes project 2) project, 
the World Bank undertook a project, OLP-1, for government management of 
some lakes. These lakes were withdrawn from the auction-lease system and 
placed under the management of the Department of Fisheries (DoF). Teams of 
fishers were appointed to carry out fishing, for which they were paid 40% of the 
value of the catch. This was a substantial improvement in fishers’ share, which 
remained at around 25% in privately-leased lakes. 
 
Budgetary constraints meant that funds for operating expenses, especially 
stocking in the government-run lakes was often inadequate, or not released on 
time.  As a result private money was also used to carry out stocking, which was 
not shown on the books. The result was that the government-run lakes were both 
making losses in official accounts, while allowing a number of officials to earn 
quite large profits. Of course, the fishers did earn their 40% share of total fishing 
income. 
 
Forms of decentralization have taken a new shape with co-management, where 
local government organizations join with the community in managing the 
resource. The involvement of local government, not as a facilitator, but as a co-
manager, has disadvantages as it increases opportunities for rent-seeking.  
 
The best example of the dangers of co-management was in the Third Fisheries 
Project. With fisheries and local government officials, and, of course, fish traders 
all involved in completely unregulated and unmonitored “stocking” paid for out of 
public funds. Unfortunately, this practice was repeated in the Fourth Fisheries 
Project. As a report pointed out, “… at Boro Beel,… it was widely believed that 
the stocking was considerably lower than officially recorded” (Aeron-Thomas, 
2005, p. 4).  
 
In co-management the resource use decisions are made not by the users, or 
even the so-called community, but by a negotiation process between the 
government (meaning its officials) and the users or community. In this 
negotiation, the balance is weighted in favour of the more powerful officials.  
 
In any case the agendas of government and users may be quite different. As 
pointed out with regard to the Fourth Fisheries Project, “… it was almost 
inevitable, given DoF priorities, that ‘growth’ in production rather than a concern 
with equity would infuse project activities,” (Saleha Begum, 2004, p. 6). Further,   4
since DoF is “driven by numerical targets the need to ‘stock’1 over-rode the need 
to take time to form strong CBOs (Community Based Organizations) 
(Rapporteur’s Report, 2005, p. 3). This is not unique to Bangladesh or to 
fisheries. It is common to government departments in other countries too. The 
experience of various co-management forestry schemes, often called Joint 
Forest Management, has shown that the agenda of the Forest Department, 
which is that of the maximization of timber growth rather than maximization of 
impact on the livelihoods of forest dwellers, invariably dominates the so-called 
Joint Forest Management committees. A study of numerous such sites in China, 
India and the Philippines, concluded, “…devolution policies in our case sites 
have reflected the conceptual frameworks and interests of foresters and, as a 
result, have disappointed local forest users with different expectations of 
devolution,” (David Edmunds, et al, 2004, p. 166). 
 
But, government departments and local government organizations have an 
important role in facilitating resource management by users. In various projects, 
government departments and officials have played key roles in facilitating 
transfer of water-bodies to fishers and in establishing their user rights. Technical 
departments, like DoF, have additionally important roles to play in disseminating 
technical knowledge. As a whole, government and other state organs, have to 
provide various kinds of public goods that are needed for the development of 
fishers and fisheries.  
 
What is needed is for a division of responsibilities between government and 
fishers. As pointed out with respect to forestry, “… convergence [of interests 
between government and forest users] was more likely to occur where local 
people and government officials divided roles and responsibilities in ways that 
enabled local people to make their own day-to-day livelihood choices with a 
maximum of discretion, while the state provided support for these choices and 
controlled the quality of public good outputs,” (David Edmunds, et al, 2004, p. 
168). What may be counter-productive is for increased state involvement in 
fisheries in new terms, i.e. the terms of poverty reduction, just as forest 
departments around Asia now justify their intervention in terms of environmental 
protection rather than timber production targets (Guha, 2001). 
 
While suggesting that the state should play an enabling (through appropriate 
legislation and decisions) and facilitating (supporting user groups to secure and 
establish user rights and medium- to long-term tenure), one should note that 
there is also a positive role for decentralization. Decentralization enables some 
types of decision-making to be brought geographically, even socially, closer to 
the affected people.  However this does not mean that decisions will be taken in 
favour of the users. Given the domination of local elites, the opposite is more 
likely to occur. But the geographical closeness does make it more possible for 
the users, the CPR, to mobilize and try to influence local administrative 
                                            
1 The DoF need to ‘stock’, also coincides with the officials’ need to maximize rent-earning 
opportunities.   5
decisions; while, when the decision are all concentrated at the district 
headquarters, or even at Dhaka, it would be very difficult for poor fishers to bring 
much influence to bear on those decisions.  
 
Before the OLP-2 project there was a situation where a few lakes were being run 
under government management, with the usual problems of losses for the 
government exchequer, while the majority of the lakes were on auction-based, 
short-term leases. Stocking levels were very low in the leased lakes and most of 
them were in a derelict condition, overgrown with water hyacinth and other 
vegetation choking the water bodies. The limited benefits of lake fishing were 
disproportionately captured by the lease-holders, while the fishers got 25% of the 
catch. 
 
The private monopoly of the lease-holder could have overcome the externality 
problem. But there was a problem of difficulty in or high-cost of securing user 
rights over all the residents of lake-shore villages. At the same time, the lake is 
not really divisible.2 But granting a private monopoly is not only difficult to 
enforce (though, it should be less so now than in the early 1990s), but would, as 
Partha Dasgupta (2005, p. 1611) points out, grant far too much power to one 
person. Further, and more important for our purpose it would have a limited effect 
on poverty reduction – as seen the fishers are likely to get 25% of the catch, 
albeit of an increased catch. This, however, does bring out the point that a 
managed resource, with investment of capital, is likely to provide some benefits 
to the fishers compared to a relatively unmanaged resource with little or no 
investment. 
 
COMMON PROPERTY RESOURCES 
 
In discussing common property resources (CPRs) it is necessary to make a 
distinction from “open access” systems. In open access systems there is no 
regulation on the persons who have access to benefits and the quantities that 
they can fish from the resource. In an open access system the fishers have no 
responsibility for maintenance of the resource. Even if access is granted only to 
particular persons (e.g. fishers, or members of an indigenous community) but if 
there is no restriction on the amount that each person can draw, then there is 
likely to be a degradation of the resource – if the technology permits a rate of 
extraction that is greater than the rate of regeneration of the resource.  
 
One of the first requirements in setting up a common property resource (CPR) 
system is a specification of its members. Extraction should be restricted to a fixed 
number of users, chosen on the basis of some criteria. In choosing members of 
the user group there have been three different approaches. The first is that of 
making membership open to all those who belong to the relevant community. An 
example of this approach is the Fourth Fisheries Project (FFP). The second is 
                                            
2 That is until new, costly and risky technologies like cage culture are adopted.    6
that of restricting membership to those who participate in the relevant form of 
labour (fishing or forest products extraction); examples of which are OLP-2, 
AqDP and CBFM. The third is to combine fishers along with other users, e.g. 
agriculturists in the immediate neighbourhood of the lake who draw on its waters 
for irrigating their fields; as has been done in the SCBRMP and in MACH.  
 
The Fourth Fisheries Project (FFP) experience of allowing any person, and not 
just fishers, in the relevant community, has been analyzed in FFP papers by 
Mark Aeron-Thomas (2005) and Saleha Begum (2004). These studies provide 
useful analyses of the problems faced when no distinction is made between 
fisher and non-fisher community members.  
 
“For the first round (2000-1) of sites, no requirements were set by the project as 
to the composition of the FMCs (Fish Management Committees), except that 
they had to be made up of representatives of the VDCs (Village Development 
Committees). As the VDCs were open to all members of the community, rather 
than just professional fishers, their representatives were predominantly drawn 
from local elites. This meant that non-fishers were quickly and firmly in control,” 
(Aeron-Thomas, 2005, p.24). The project responded by changing procedures for 
the second round (2001-2) of sites, with the VDC being replaced by a Fisheries 
Sub-Committee (FSC) in each village, and with a requirement that 75-80% of 
both committees and two out of three office bearers should be genuine fishers. 
 
Non-fishers used their general dominance of local politics, and their ability to 
provide the capital required for stocking which shows is that it is important not 
only to specify the sections from whom members of the CPR will be drawn, but 
also to work out methods of providing access to capital, such that members can 
provide equal amounts, or equal shares, of capital to the CPR. This, as will be 
seen later on, is quite important for fishers to establish or retain control over the 
CPR enterprise.  
 
It is generally better to form a group of the users (e.g. irrigators, fishers, forest 
users, etc.), rather than the general population of the area.3 There are a number 
of reasons for this: 
•   There are divergent interests between users and others.  
•   User groups have a common material interest in using and managing the 
resource, even, perhaps, sustainably.  
•   User groups would be more homogenous than the general population of 
the area. 
•   Both benefits and costs would be more transparent in a user group and 
the returns are likely to make participation worthwhile. 
•   They are more likely to be able to develop pro-CPR norms of social 
functioning. 
 
                                            
3 This draws on Harry Blair (1996).   7
The inclusion of only fishers can be attempted through a condition that 
membership is conditional on participation in fishing, say, for at least 75% or so 
of fishing days, as was introduced in OLP-2, and has since been adopted in most 
other projects. But even this is not fool-proof. In a situation where the fishers, are 
weak, there could be elaborate fictions to show that all members are participating 
in fishing, when that is actually not the case. But by restricting members to 
fishers it is at least possible to reduce the incidence of open domination of CPRs 
by the elite. In India, community-based aquaculture is also organized on the 
basis of “common interest groups” (Radheshyam, 2001). 
 
At the same time, the phrase restricting members to fishers may itself need to be 
extended to include other poor or other relevant users. The first point arises 
when the number of fishers living near the lake is too few for a CPR. If it 
becomes necessary to increase the number of members, this could be done by 
including other poor, who are willing to learn and regularly participate in fishing. 
This, of course, will only be possible if the returns from fishing are somewhat 
more than the returns from the alternative, say, daily wage labour.  
 
Another manner in which it could be necessary or beneficial for the CPR to 
extend its membership beyond fishers, is, for instance, that where the silted up 
portions of the beel, though registered as khas land, have been occupied by 
agriculturists. This has been done in both SCBRMP and CBFM, in the interest of 
getting more support for the CPR. Most of these agriculturists are quite small 
holders and there is a restriction that they can only make an equal contribution to 
the Beel User Group’s (BUG’s) finances. They cannot contribute more of the 
capital and thus claim more of the profits.  
 
Establishing user rights of the fishers CPR over the resource is something that is 
difficult for CPR members to do on their own. They require support from the local 
administration and from the community around them. In one way or the other, the 
establishment and spread of a social norm that accepts the CPR on the water-
body, is necessary for setting up and running a CPR. Without this social norm, 
which itself can be brought about through a number of attempts, each perhaps 
less conflict-ridden than the last, guarding would be too expensive and might 
make the water-body itself unprofitable to manage. Social fencing, through an 
accepted social norm, can considerably reduce the need for guarding, i.e. reduce 
the transaction costs and increase the return to invested capital and labour. 
 
WOMEN IN FISHERIES 
 
Although women generally do not get involved directly in fishing in most parts of 
Bangladesh, there are many stages of chain between boat and consumption 
where women are involved.  
 
Starting with the well-known Mymensingh Aquaculture Extension Project there 
has been an increasing involvement of women in aquaculture. That project   8
showed that women, possibly because of their greater time spent in and around 
the homestead, are able to achieve higher productivity than men in household 
ponds. OLP-2 initiated a process of women acquiring user rights in ponds on 
khas lands, though it was often difficult for women to retain their control over 
these ponds, in the face of attempts of various politically stronger male groups to 
seize their ponds. AqDP successfully combined training in pond aquaculture with 
credit, to enable women to set up commercial fisheries in household ponds that 
had formerly been used for fish culture only occasionally and fitfully.  In both 
CBFM and SCBRMP women have been playing a role in sorting fish and drying 
fish as a commercial activity.  
 
Combining all these varied tasks within the fish value chain, and adapting a 
holistic view of this value chain, will enable making a policy for women’s 
involvement in fisheries. SCBRMP has, for instance, decided that women would 
form 25% of members of the Beel User Groups (BUGs) and have at least one 
member in the Beel Management Committee (BMC). 
 
Gender equality is both a goal of poverty reduction and an instrument for the 
same. Thus, when there is an attempt to link fisheries with poverty reduction and 
the PRSP, it is necessary to consider the manner in which gender concerns can 





In order to establish a CPR it is necessary to have a clear category of members 
who are entitled to participate and share in the use of the resource. It is also 
necessary to have a clear physical boundary, within which the CPR has the 
authority to manage the fishery. With lakes it is often difficult to set up such clear 
boundaries. The ox-bow lakes can be turned, with screens or embankments, into 
water-bodies that are closed for all practical purposes. But with beels in the haor 
region, such enclosure is not only difficult, but also not even desirable. The 
existence of mobile fish is essential to the productivity of these water-bodies. In 
the monsoon period, and until the lakes are more-or-less isolated from each 
other in the dry season, the whole haor is a single sheet of water. When 
management is restricted just to the beels, what usually happens is that CPR 
members guard against poaching in their own areas, and simultaneously go out 
to poach in other, possibly unguarded areas or in the open waters of the haor. 
This is especially so in the monsoon period when the fishers have no alternative 
work. This monsoon fishing is made even more destructive by the fact that this is 
the spawning period, therefore affecting the productivity of the fishery by a 
multiple of the fish caught.  
 
The strong externalities within beels in a haor region (a vast flood-plain) makes it 
necessary to try and bring the whole haor within the management system. Only 
in that way will it be possible to internalize the benefits of managing the resource,   9
as, for instance, by making effective a ban on fishing in the spawning period. 
Thus, as both the MACH and SCBRMP projects have decided, it is necessary to 
bring under management “entire ecological and hydrological units to the extent 
possible” (MACH, 2002, p. 85) 
 
ESTABLISHING USER RIGHTS 
 
There has been one important effect common to all of the various development 
interventions. As compared to the situation in the early 90s, now there is an 
acceptance of the user rights of the designated lease-holder, whether it is a 
private individual, a fishers’ group, government department or the community. 
This, however, is so only for the more-or-less closed baors (ox-bow lakes). Not 
much of active guarding is needed. Or, when there is poaching it is not a matter 
of right, but one of stealing. It is not a coincidence that this has occurred in water-
bodies where aquaculture has more or less replaced capture fisheries, and fish 
are the result of stocking and even fertilization with inorganic and organic 
fertilizers. There is labour and capital involved in all these activities, and not just 
in the catching of fish, as with capture fisheries. 
 
In the open beels, which are only isolated from the floodplains in the dry season, 
there is much more guarding required. Again, it is not a coincidence that fishing 
in the beel is mainly a matter of capture fishery and only secondarily a matter of 
stocking, i.e. of investment of capital and labour in activities other than capture of 
fish.  
 
Initially the transaction costs involved in investment in lakes were quite high and 
years were taken to establish these rights. In the early- to mid-90s OLP-2 it took 
years and a lot of labour in guarding to establish user rights. But at the time of 
the AqDP in this decade, it has neither taken as long nor required as much 
guarding to establish user rights. In a sense, the change in norms of access to 
resources, identified by Douglas North (2005) as the critical issue in development 
has, to some extent, been established with regard to leased lakes but this is not 
yet true in large parts of the flood plain, the haors, which are still regarded as 
open access. Fishers think nothing of guarding their own beels, but catching fish 
in the rest of the haor, or even in unguarded beels. Fishing in the haors or even 
beels is still often a matter of either stealth (fishing in a small boat that can pass 
unseen in the mist), or might (fishing or guarding with armed parties).  
 
The establishment of user rights of the lessee, where they are fishers, has also 
become easier because of positive changes in attitudes of various sections of the 
government. In the early 90s, despite decisions in Dhaka on the handover of 
baors to the OLP-2, it was not an easy job to actually secure those transfers. 
There were various obstacles and negotiations at all levels of administration. But 
more recently, both with the AqDP and the SCBRMP projects, such handovers 
have become somewhat easier, once decisions are secured in Dhaka. In the 
SCBRMP sections of the local administration were also willing to quickly   10
intervene to resolve disputed claims and establish boundaries. All this has 
accelerated the process of securing user rights of the lessees, where they are 
fishers. Of course, there are still at times court cases to be resolved. And there 
are instances (e.g Raisha Beel) where the controlling group stated plainly that 
they had paid a large sum to the DC’s office to secure the lease. But this is a far 
cry from the situation where there frequent obstacles at every stage4.  
 
In their struggles against former lease-holders or other local elites, and in 
establishing the user rights of the CPR, fishers necessarily have to rely on an 
overall acceptance of these user rights by those living around the baors. If large 
numbers people who are not CPR members continue to catch fish, as they used 
to before the project, then the CPR members investing in stocking fingerlings 
would not get a return on this investment. Securing acceptance of the CPR’s 
user rights is thus crucial to the success of the project.  
 
This has been done through a number of channels. The first was to give user 
rights to the fishers and other poor living around the baors. Those who used to 
be the main persons catching fish were themselves made the owners of the 
fishing rights (as CPR members).  Although the CPR could establish their user 
rights just through guarding to prevent others fishing, this would be very costly, 
whether in terms of their own time (if the CPR members act as guards 
themselves), or in terms of money (when guards are hired). In fact, any such 
change in access rights, turning what was formerly an open access system 
(either because there was no lease, or the lease was not rigorously enforced) 
into a managed CPR, depends crucially on social acceptance of the change.  
 
Besides the CPR itself, an important factor in establishing user rights is the stand 
taken by local officials. Where local government officers, like UNO, or department 
officers, as of DoF or LGED, go to support the CPRs, and where there are visits 
from higher officials, then there is a demonstration of the measure of official 
support. This support is very important in gaining social acceptance of the fishers 
using the baor as their CPR. The NGO too plays a role, not only in organizing the 
CPR but also in showing its support to the CPR and helping them to negotiate 
with the local power structure. 
 
The roads built by OLP-2 and AqDP right up to the fish landing centres at each 
baor have improved the local law and order situation. The clean environment of 
the landing centre and the lake waters make it a scenic spot. Many persons, 
such as college students, and officials and their families visit some of these baors 
on holidays. This too increases the social contacts of the CPRs and increases 
their social capital. 
 
                                            
4 There remains a problem of excessive lease charges for some water bodies.  These often bear 
no relation to the productivity of the resource, but can be bid up by influential elites who then use 
the legal system to avoid making actual payments.  In other systems wealthy individuals seem 
motivated to pay over the odds for a lease because of apparent status it confers.        11
What one can see is that empowerment, as the ability to bring about and sustain 
a change, is a combination of a number of factors. First, there is the handover of 
the baors to the CPRs. Second, there is the support for this change from officials. 
Third, is the acceptance of the general local population and their support. 
Numerous actions of the CPRs have helped bring about this general acceptance, 
even if these actions were not necessarily consciously aimed at achieving such 
acceptance. Finally, what counts in empowerment is the power of numbers, both 
in terms of the number of members and in terms of the amount of capital 




The difficulty in establishing user rights when combined with the dis-incentive 
effect of short-term leases, further reduces the return from stocking or semi-
intensive aquaculture. When lake fishing shifts from capture to semi-intensive 
(stocking, without fertilizer use) or intensive (stocking plus fertilizer use) some 
infrastructure is needed. Landing platforms are needed with connections to the 
main roads connecting to the markets, so as to be able to carry at a reasonable 
cost the high volume of fish to the market. Even if the government were to 
provide this infrastructure, with a short lease there would be no incentive to 
maintain or improve infrastructure.  
 
Along with this infrastructure investment disincentive, short term leases 
encourage destructive methods of fishing. There is an attempt to fish out the lake 
at the end of every year. In the beels this has led to the particularly destructive 
method of de-watering to catch all possible fish. This reduces the numbers of 
breeding fish for the next season, leading, over time, to a fall in fish stocks.  
 
Projects, like OLP-2, AqDP, SCBRMP, CBFM-2 and MACH have secured long-
term leases, usually of 10 years at a time, but for up to 20 or even 50 years (as in 
the case of OLP-2).  
 
CIRCUMSTANCES FOR A FUNCTIONING CPR GROUP 
 
Management of a CPR is usually governed by an agreement between the 
members to cooperate in the managing of the resource and in sharing its 
benefits. The agreement, if not indefinite, is expected to last at least as long as 
the group has the lease or access to the resource. What binds the group together 
is that they have a joint lease over the water-bodies.  
 
Under what conditions is such an agreement to equal sharing likely to last? This 
question is important given that some members could, at least for some time, 
break the agreement and corner a higher share of the benefits. Agreement can 
be kept if all parties discount the future benefits from the CPR at a low enough 
rate (Partha Dasgupta, 2005). Within this general situation of a low discounting of   12
future incomes from the CPR, there are a number of specific features that will 
promote cooperation.  
 
Agreements are less likely to be broken when members care about each other, 
or have inter-dependent utilities; or, if they have a pro-social disposition however 
the fishing groups in most of the projects under consideration do not form a 
homogenous social group. They tend to be a mixture of traditional fishers and 
other poor, combining Hindus and Muslims and do not have a history of prior 
collective action. Breaking an agreement to equal sharing of returns is not likely 
to meet much or even any social ostracism. 
 
Such a situation only reinforces the point that, where there are temptations to 
break agreements, because the returns are large, then there is a need for 
punishment for breaking the agreement. The enforcement of the agreement 
could be either through mutual enforcement by the members or through external 
enforcement. Mutual enforcement is of course the preferred alternative. If 
ordinary members could be counted upon to regularly monitor activities of the 
committee members, and make credible threats of sanctions for those breaking 
the norms, then it may be quite easy to keep CPRs functioning  
 
Self-monitoring can be taken a step further by peer monitoring. This has been 
introduced in SCBRMP, where members from one Credit Organization (CO) 
audit the accounts of another CO. But besides having the knowledge to monitor, 
the members of the CPR also need to have the power to impose sanctions on 
those breaking the rules. This is easier said than done. Removing an errant 
member, or refusing to transact with him for one or a number of years, is not so 
easy, when the target is one who as a committee member is likely to have 
developed connections with power brokers in the locality, even if he did not 
already have them at the inception of the CPR – removing such a member is 
difficult. This can then lead to a situation where a new equilibrium is reached, 
wherein some get a higher share of the benefits than others (Partha Dasgupta 
2005). 
 
Why do the ordinary members settle for an unequal share? It must be that their 
benefits are still more than they could otherwise expect. “… even though the 
agreement is to share the benefits of cooperation unequally, both parties gain 
from cooperation” (Partha Dasgupta, 2005, p. 1618) and, thus, the CPR 
continues to exist, although with unequal benefits to members. While this is 
worse than the situation of a democratically functioning CRP, it is still likely to be 
better than a situation where there has been no history of a democratically-
functioning CPR. In a sense, those trying to corner a disproportionate share of 
benefits, cannot just take their control of the CPR for granted but, instead, have 
to buy-off other members.  
 
The biggest source of uncertainty in CPR management in Bangladesh is that of 
political or bureaucratic interference in the membership of the CPR management   13
group. Another possible deterioration can take place where persons from outside 
the group (local elite or officials) free-ride on the CPR and extract a large share 
of its income. A third possible deterioration relates to the necessity of raising 
working capital and stocking and other expenses. This usually results in tied 
transactions with fish traders and fingerling suppliers which will probably affect 
prices and quality. This can also result in collusion between the traders and the 
office-bearers of the CPR resulting in the effective takeover of the financial 
transactions of the CPR, as happened in some OLP-2 baors, after the withdrawal 
of BRAC from supplying credit.  
 
The above example points to the importance of maintaining equal contributions 
of capital from each member, preferably through a formal credit mechanism. A 
CPR with unequal contributions is more likely to be taken over, by those who 
supply more or most of the capital required. This also leads to a corollary: a beel, 
where there is no or little stocking and thus capital requirements are also low, is 
less likely to be a target for takeover by financial interests, as compared to a 
baor, where stocking levels and capital requirements are both high.  
 
THE ROLE OF NGOs 
 
NGOs have played an important role in all of the CPR projects, except the 
SCBRMP. They have had two functions. One is to form and facilitate CPR 
groups. The other is to provide credit, usually as micro-credit to the members but 
meant for collective use by the CPR.  
 
Credit for stocking is a form of working capital. Finance for stocking can be 
procured in either one or a combination of three ways. It can be provided by 
MFIs, or even commercial banks. It can be provided by fingerling suppliers or fish 
traders, usually the wholesale traders, arathdars. It can also be provided through 
the CPR’s own savings.  
 
The facilitation of CPR formation and support in establishing user rights is 
another function that NGOs have often been contracted to provide. But NGOs in 
Bangladesh are basically MFIs. Micro-credit is their core business and all else 
tends to be subordinated to the goal of giving and recovering credit. 
Consequently they tend to minimize their other facilitating activities. Experience 
in the Fourth Fisheries Project, where a number of NGOs, big and small, were 
involved, showed that a number of NGOs, particularly the small, local NGOs, 
tended to side with the local elite in monopolizing returns from fishing and side-
lining fishers from any real involvement in management5.  
 
Two points come up with regard to the involvement of NGOs. First, it is better to 
involve national, or large NGOs, rather than small, local NGOs. The local NGOs 
                                            
5 See Aeron-Thomas (2005) for details of NGO functioning in the Fourth Fisheries Project, some 
of it in collusion with DoF officials.   14
tend to be more linked to local power structures, or unwilling to act in the 
interests of fishers to confront local power structures. It would then be preferable 
to involve large, national NGOs, which have a reputation to maintain. This need 
to maintain a reputation would work in favour of checking local units and even 
taking action if they collude with the local elite against the interests of the fishers. 
 
At the same time, one cannot simply presume that the interests of the NGO 
necessarily coincide with those of the project, or the CPR.  As the failure of 
BRAC to fulfil its contracted post-project responsibilities in OLP-2 shows, it is 
also necessary to devise an incentive system for NGOs, so that it is in their 




In any group activity there will always be conflicts often due to domination of the 
group by a few individuals. Ways of trying to check such domination are through 
rotating leadership, spreading knowledge, technical and marketing, and mutual 
enforcement of norms.  
 
Not all of the problems can be solved within the group meaning that some form of 
conflict resolution process becomes necessary. During the life of a project this is 
usually through project officials and NGOs. But what happens after a project 
closes and the CPR group has to manage its own affairs? An important 
consideration is that it should be local and thus available for low cost and also 
able to intervene in a timely manner.  
 
There are four ways in which the problem of a forum for conflict resolution has 
been approached:  
•   CPR groups can be part of a nested hierarchy, and higher levels, such as 
cluster-level CPR committee in a haor, could serve as the dispute 
resolution forum for individual beel CPRs, both for their own internal 
problems and in disputes between beel CPRs.  
•   Disputes could be resolved by recourse to the state, however rent-seeking 
by state officials, may make this costly.  
•   There have been attempts to develop some sort of local-level dispute 
resolution mechanisms, in the form of the village shalish. But these have 
not yet taken off. And, to the extent they exist, they are heavily biased 
against the poor, women and minorities. The problem with the shalish is 
not a matter of training to make them more responsive to those they are 
meant to serve. It is a matter of the shalish having deep roots in the 
existing socio-political structure of domination by rich men.  
•   NGOs could play the role of arbitrators (Anna Knox and Ruth Meinzen-
Dick, 2001). As experience in the OLP-2 showed, it is preferable to have 
not just the NGO but also officials of the relevant government department, 
DoF, LGED, or whichever department is connected with the CPRs. Having 
both NGO and departmental officials in a conflict resolution or appeals   15
forum, gives more scope for the weaker persons or groups within a CPR 
to find someone who will be willing to listen to their appeal, although even 
this is not fool-proof (Aeron-Thomas, 2005).  
 
POVERTY AND SOCIAL CAPITAL IMPACTS 
 
Taking control of boars as common-property resources, means there is frequent 
interaction between members of the CPR. Besides working together, they have 
also build relations as social groups, often participating jointly in festivals (both 
Hindu and Muslim) and other events.  Relations between group members are 
strengthened by the practice of giving members wages for fishing days on which 
they are genuinely sick and so cannot work with the rest of the group. The 
increased interaction between group members, going beyond work requirements, 
leads to closer relationships and strengthens their internal social capital.  
 
CPR members have seen a substantial change in their economic and social 
status. In terms of income and consumption status, fishers in well-managed 
baors of OLP-2, from having been among the poorest in the villages before the 
project, had come up to a lower-middle status by the end of the project. They felt 
that they had clearly moved out of poverty. Of course, not all would have made 
such a move out of poverty, but they felt that many of them had made this move. 
One way in which this was reflected was in the common understanding that their 
children, girls and boys alike, would study as long as they could, even beyond 
high school. Insufficient income was no longer felt to be a reason to stop their 
studies.  
 
But in Talbaria (AqDP), one of the autocratically-managed baors, where fishers 
just get a wage of Tk.100 per fishing day (or 20% of the catch in other such 
baors) that the fishers, though generally very quiet, said that they were poor 
before the project and are remain poor now.  
 
The change in economic status of CPR members in well-managed baors is 
reinforced by the fact that CPRs are fairly large economic units, some with net 
annual income running into Tk.1.75 million (Sirishdia baor, AqDP), Tk.2.0 million 
(Chand Beel, AqDP), or even more than Tk.2 million (Bahadurpur and Porapara 
of OLP-2). For such medium-size enterprises, it is not difficult to make donations 
of Tk.10,000 for local social causes, something that hardly any individuals in 
these villages would be able to do. The CPRs have used their economic strength 
to support a variety of local social causes, from primary schools to hospitals and 
sports clubs.  
 
In the course of the Project the CPR committee members, in particular, have 
interacted with various government officials and many officials, both from 
Bangladesh and outside, have visited the baors to see the project. All this 
contributes to increasing the social contacts of the fishers. With this there is also 
a new dignity, typified in some leaders being addressed as, for example, “Haldar   16
Mahashay”, meaning “Mr. Haldar”, rather than the earlier “jhele”, which is a 
pejorative for the Hindu fishing caste.  
 
To establish the lease rights of the CPRs the fishers, with support from the 
LNGO and some government officials, have had to struggle against former lease 
holders and sections of the local elite. These struggles have strengthened their 
internal cohesion and success has given them a confidence which is noticeable 
in their manner of speaking and behaving. The hesitation to speak with officials, 
noticeable at the beginning of the project, is no longer there. Of course, this has 
not changed uniformly among members, with the leaders much more 
transformed than others. But over all there is a confidence and cheerfulness that 




In concluding this review, we shall sum up some of the desirable design features, 
or good practices, for a CPR, as they have emerged from the review. Many of 
these desirable design features correspond to those which in the literature have 
also been identified as being necessary for a successful CPR (for example, 
Ostrom, 1990 and 1999).  
 
•   CPR members chosen from the users (fishers and/or agriculturists 
adjoining the beel); 
•   Clearly defined social boundaries: A set of individuals with rights to use 
the resource and its physical boundary itself being defined; 
•   Secure and medium- to long-term lease at an affordable cost; 
•   Equity in sharing expenses and income, i.e. benefits from the CPR; 
•   Democratic, transparent and inclusive management of the CPR, with 
support from external agencies, relevant departments of the state and 
NGOs; 
•   Monitoring by the users themselves; 
•   Graduated sanctions for violations of CPR rules; and 
•   Conflict-resolution mechanism, such that there can be quick access to 
low-cost, local forums for resolving conflicts.  
 
For the above a set of enabling conditions is also necessary: 
•   Government decision to handover lakes to CPRs of users on secure and 
medium- to long-term leases at reasonable cost; 
•   Support from relevant government departments and officials to CPRs 
establishing secure user rights and the boundaries of their resource; 
•   Infrastructure development to meet the new needs of increased fish 
production and to bring the water body into the orbit of state governance; 
and  
•   Provision of working capital through an MFI or other such official (as 




Aeron –Thomas, Mark, 2005, “Beneficiary Impact Monitoring of Open-Water 
Fisheries in Bangladesh: Findings and Lessons Learned,” Fourth Fisheries 
Project, Department of Fisheries, Dhaka 
 
Apu, N. A., Md. A. Sattar, D. Nathan, J. D. Balarin and H. A. J. Middendorp, 
1999, “Fisheries Co-management and Sustainable Common Property Regimes 
Based on Long-term Security of Tenure in Oxbow Lakes in Bangladesh,” in Hans 
Middendorp, Paul Thompson and Robert Pomeroy, editors, Sustainable Inland 
Fisheries Management in Bangladesh, Manila, ICLARM 
 
Begum, Saleha, 2004, Pro-Poor Community Based Fisheries Management: 
Issues and Case Studies, Fourth Fisheries Project Report No. 7, Department of 
Fisheries, Dhaka 
 
Blair, Harry, 1996, “Democracy, Equity and Common Property Resource 
Management in the Indian Subcontinent,” in Development and Change, Vol. 27, 
ISS, The Hague 
 
Dasgupta, Partha, 2005, “Common Property Resources: Economic Analysis,” in 
Economic and Political Weekly, Mumbai, April 16 
 
Demsetz, H., 1983, “The Structure of Ownership and the Theory of the Firm,” in 
Journal of Law and Development, 26 (June) 
 
Department of Fisheries, 2006, Fisheries Sector Action Plan and Fisheries Sub-
Sector Road Map, Final Draft, Dhaka 
 
Edmunds, David, Eva Wollenberg, Antonio Contreras, Liu Dachang, Govind 
Kelkar, Dev Nathan, Madhu Sarin and Neera Singh, 2004, “Conclusion,” in David 
Edmunds and Eva Wollenberg, editors, Local Forest Management: The Impacts 
of Devolution Policies, London, Earthscan 
 
Guha, Ramchandra, 2001, “The Prehistory of Community Forestry in India,” in 
Environmental History, 6(2) 
 
IFAD, 2006, Project Completion Report, Aquaculture Development Project, 
Rome, IFAD 
  
Knox, Anna and Ruth Meinzen-Dick, 2001, Collective Action, Property Rights and 
Devolution of Natural Resource Management: Exchange of Knowledge and 
Implications for Policy, A Workshop Summary, IFPRI 
   18
Kornai, janos, 1993, “Market Socialism Revisited,” in Pranab Bardhan and John 
Roemer, editors, Market Socialism, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
MACH (Management of Aquatic Ecosystem through Community Management), 
2002, MACH Completion Report, Volume 1, Main Report, 
http://www.machban.org/FinalReport/  
 
Middendorp, Hans and John Balarin, 1999, “Fisheries Enhancement and 
Participatory Aquatic Resource Management in the Oxbow Lakes Projects in 
Bangladesh,” in Hans Middendorp, Paul Thompson and Robert Pomeroy, 
editors, Sustainable Inland Fisheries Management in Bangladesh, Manila, 
ICLARM 
 
Nathan, Dev and N. A. Apu, 2004, “IFAD Innovation Mainstreaming Initiative: 
Case Study of the Oxbow Lakes Small-Scale Fishermen’s Project (OLSSFP) 
Bangladesh,” IFAD, Rome 
 
North, Douglass, 2005, The Process of Economic Change,  
 
Olson, Mancur, 2000, Power and Prosperity, New York, Basic Books 
 
Ostrom, Elinor, 1990, Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for 
Collective Action,Cambridge, Cambridge University Press 
 
Ostrom, Elior, 1999, Self-Governance and Forest Resources, Occasional Paper 
No. 20, Bogor, CIFOR 
 
Radheshaym, 2001, “Community-Based Aquaculture in India – Strengths, 
Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats,” in Naga, Vol24, Nos. 1 & 2, January-
June 
  
Rapporteur’s Report, 2005, Fisheries and Institutional Development, Lessons 
from Fourth Fisheries Project, Expert Consultation Forum, 26 May, Dhaka.  